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3 AbstrACt (ENG) 
Is there a link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention? This article 
tries to answer the question by presenting the state of the art of the intersection of 
both concepts. Provided that social conflict is inevitable and given the appearance 
of new threats and types of violence, as well as new demands for security based on 
people (human security), our societies should focus on promoting peaceful changes. 
Through an extensive analysis of the existing literature and the study of several cases, 
this paper suggests that decentralized governance can contribute to these efforts by 
transforming conflicts, bringing about power-sharing and inclusion incentives of 
minority groups. Albeit the complexity of assessing its impact on conflict preven-
tion, it can be contended that decentralized governance might have very positive 
effects on the reduction of causes that bring about conflicts due to its ability to fos-
ter the creation of war/violence preventors. More specifically, this paper argues that 
decentralization can have a positive impact on the so-called triggers and accelerators 
(short- and medium-term causes).
Keywords: violent conflict prevention, war causes, decentralised governance, 
decentralisation, violence preventors, peace building
 AbstrACt (CAt) 
Existeix alguna relació entre governabilitat descentralitzada i prevenció de conflic-
tes? El present article intenta respondre a aquesta pregunta presentant la situació 
actual de la intersecció entre ambdós conceptes. Partint del fet que el conflicte soci-
al és inevitable, així com de l’existència de noves amenaces i conflictes i de noves 
demandes de seguretat basades en les persones (seguretat humana), les nostres soci-
etats han d’intentar que els canvis siguin pacífics. A través d’un exhaustiu anàlisis 
de la bibliografia existent i de l’estudi de diversos casos, aquest article sosté que la 
governabilitat descentralitzada pot contribuir a aquests esforços transformant con-
flictes, fomentant el repartiment de poder i augmentant els incentius d’inclusió de 
grups minoritaris. Tot i la dificultat de mesurar el seu impacte sobre la prevenció de 
conflictes, s’ argumenta que la governabilitat descentralitzada pot tenir un impacte 
molt positiu en la reducció de les causes que produeixen conflictes gràcies a la seva 
habilitat per crear war/violence preventors. Més concretament, en aquest article se 
suggereix que la governabilitat descentralitzada pot influir positivament sobre les 
causes a curt i mitjà termini. 
Paraules clau: prevenció de conflictes violents; causes de les guerres; governança 
descentralitzada; descentralització; preventors de la violència; construcció de pau
4 AbstrACt (EsP) 
¿Existe alguna relación entre gobernabilidad descentralizada y prevención de conflic-
tos? El presente artículo intenta responder a esta pregunta presentando la situación 
actual de la intersección de ambos conceptos. Partiendo del hecho que el conflicto 
social es inevitable, así como de la existencia de nuevas amenazas y conflictos y de 
nuevas demandas de seguridad basadas en las personas (seguridad humana), nuestras 
sociedades deben intentar que los cambios sean pacíficos. A través de un exhaustivo 
análisis de la bibliografía existente y del estudio de varios casos, este artículo sugiere 
que la gobernabilidad descentralizada puede contribuir a dichos esfuerzos transfor-
mando conflictos, fomentando el reparto de poder y aumentando los incentivos de 
inclusión de grupos minoritarios. A pesar de la dificultad de medir su impacto en la 
prevención de conflictos, se argumenta que la gobernabilidad descentralizada puede 
tener un impacto muy positivo en la reducción de las causas que producen conflictos 
gracias a su habilidad de crear war/violence preventors. Más concretamente, este 
artículo sugiere que la gobernabilidad descentralizada puede influir positivamente 
sobre las causas a corto y medio plazo.
Palabras clave: prevención de conflictos violentos, causas de las guerras, gober-
nanza descentralizada, descentralización, preventores de la violencia, construcción 
de paz
5Paper presented at the Barcelona Forum on Decentralizated Governance and Con-
flict Prevention, July 2009.
 1 .  INIt IAl AssumPtIoNs AND  
 objECtIvEs 
This draft of a working paper summarizes parts of an ongoing investigation into 
decentralized governance and the prevention of violent conflicts. This paper, which 
also acts in preparation for a special observatory to be developed by the International 
Catalan Institute for Peace on this topic, puts forward two tasks:
• An extensive analysis of the existing literature dedicated to conflict prevention and 
in particular the capacity of decentralized governance to provide inclusive incen-
tives and reduce (or eliminate) the risk of violence in one or more phases of con-
flict.  Specific case studies of decentralized governance emerging from process of 
peacebuilding and peace agreements, as well as emerging from development proc-
esses generated through international initiatives for development cooperation will 
be awarded specific attention.   
• The conceptualization and specification of the terms conflict prevention, decen-
tralized governance and other such related concepts will be developed in order to 
devise operational definitions.
Both of the aforementioned objectives are addressed in part in this paper, which 
was prepared for the Barcelona Forum on Decentralized Governance and Conflict 
Prevention. The concept paper for the Conference states the following:  
 box 1: bArCEloNA Forum, CoNCEPt PAPEr, 2009 
Decentralized and local governance has increasingly been regarded as an instru-
ment for transforming conflicts and building peace. In this concept paper, decen-
tralized governance is intended in its most comprehensive sense, which includes 
not only the relocation of competences within central institutions (deconcentra-
tion) but also the transfer of some specific tasks to the private sector (deregula-
tion; private-public partnership) and to non-central governmental institutions 
(devolution).
In spite of this high potential, little attention has, however, been devoted to the 
role that decentralized governance and non central authorities (local and region-
al, in the EU language) may play in either preventing or exacerbating conflicts. 
Case studies analyses present mixed results. In a number of contexts character-
6ized by political volatility, actions aimed at increasing local governance capacity 
have had a positive impact on the process of national reconciliation by curtail-
ing possible threats to security (India, Macedonia, Aceh). In theoretically simi-
lar circumstances, devolution efforts have failed to prevent conflict and, in some 
extreme cases, they have even perhaps, intensified the level of confrontation 
(Bolivia, Southern Philippines).
Following the concept paper, we have organized our research from three initial 
assumptions:  
• Various approaches in peace research and conflict resolution, development stud-
ies and human security believe that decentralization and local governance can 
be used as tools in the transformation of conflicts and the construction of lasting 
peace, particularly when decentralization is understood as a genuine devolution of 
power to non-central governmental institutions. This explains why, for more than 
a decade, international organizations and the academic world have insisted on the 
benefits of decentralized governance.
• Within the research conducted on decentralized governance less attention has been 
paid to the specific link between peacebuilding and decentralization.   The role that 
decentralized governance retains as a tool to defuse violent situations or manage 
tense environments before they escalate into a significant armed clashes such that 
decentralization acts as a preventor of violent behavior has been less investigated. 
It is precisely this aspect, the possible causal relationship between decentralized 
governance and the prevention or resolution of conflict, which deserves further 
analysis.  Particularly, two types of cases, which have become more prominent in 
the last twenty years, need to be assessed: those resulting from transitions in the 
Eastern Europe, as well as those emerging from changes taking place in the Global 
South as a result of peace accords or development process occurring with the par-
ticipation of the international community.      
• A priori, and due to the available data, one is forced to start from an ambivalent 
hypothesis; the case studies of recent years present contradictory results, dis-
playing both negative and positive impacts at the short, medium and long term. 
Accordingly, this paper aims to primarily, present the state of the art of the theory 
and practical application of decentralized governance and conflict prevention. It 
will also reflect on the successes and failures of decentralization in relation to con-
flict prevention. Secondarily, this paper wants to provide a framework of opera-
tional concepts and definitions which is imperative to the analysis of this issue. 
Finally, it intends to draw a series of theoretical conclusions and provide recom-
mendations for future research areas. 
7In summary, the most basic question which must be both theoretically and prac-
tically addressed is how, in a post-Cold War environment of new armed conflicts, 
the relationship between “conflict prevention” and “decentralized governance” is 
defined.  The interaction is examined through three frames of analysis, which can be 
taken individually and/ or in tandem. The first framework is from a conflict resolu-
tion and peace research perspective. The second explores the relationship through an 
institutional design frame, focusing on elements such as democratization and decen-
tralization.  Finally, strategies of power-sharing and inclusion incentives in peace 
negotiations and agreements are employed as an analytical framework. The following 
box illustrates the three approaches to investigating the link between decentralized 
governance and conflict resolution.
 box 2: ANAlytICAl FrAmEwork AND AssumPtIoNs oN  
 thE rElAtIoNshIP bEtwEEN DECENtrAlIzED GovErNANCE  
 AND CoNFlICt trANsFormAtIoN 
1. “Conflict Resolution” and “Peace Research” is the first framework for analysis 
which will provide the bases for the investigation into the relationship between 
the two components. The central thesis of peace research is that any society can 
cope, given the appropriate instruments (so-called war preventors), with pro-
spective conflict, however complex they may be through peaceful change.  .  Or at 
least when violent change finds itself in conflict situations with peaceful change 
the net result will favor a peaceful resolution. This approach entails a certain way 
of understanding conflict prevention and peacebuilding which takes the latter as 
encompassing the first.  This approach to conflict prevention, therefore, privi-
leges two types of action in war- and conflict-torn societies in order to manage 
tense environments and bring about peace. The first response focuses on insti-
tutional choice (democratization and decentralization). The second strategy is 
one of powersharing, also understood as “peace governance”, the two additional 
analytical frames are explained below.   
2.  Institutional design and power-sharing are argued here to be two pillars of 
peaceful change in developing societies or in societies that are emerging from an 
armed conflict or trying to prevent such a fate. These foundations act as the base 
for the second analytical framework: the institutional design process, involving 
democratization in post-conflict societies or those societies with grave issues of 
inequality and exclusion.  In such cases institutional design can be applied to 
generate forms of democratic decentralization in order to promote progressive 
peaceful change. This tactic will include important forms of devolution of power 
to decentralized authorities, as well as crucial elements of social inclusion that 
will help afflicted individuals to lay down their arms.
83.  The third analytical framework emerges, within contexts of peacemaking and 
peacebuilding (political negotiations to end conflicts, in other words peace proc-
esses), from different power-sharing mechanisms and strategies which accept 
a broad understanding of the concept. In sum, governance incentives offered 
to induce armed groups to negotiate and implement peace agreements often 
include incentives such as resource-sharing, inclusion in security structures and 
several forms of territorial autonomy (Harzell and Hoddie 2007).
In conclusion and as a result of the fact that decentralized governance can poten-
tially reduce the risk of conflict arising or that it can help resolve conflicts, promot-
ing decentralization and self-governance have become key elements of political and 
administrative reform in many countries in the last twenty years.  
Following the objectives listed above, the structure of this paper will consist of: 
 box 3: outlINE 
1.   Initial Assumptions and objectives
2.  The Context: from international conflicts to human security
3.  The Analytical Framework: peace research and war and violence preventors
4.  The Conceptual Framework and Operational Definitions: conflict prevention 
and decentralized governance
5.  The state of the art: two points of view on the theory practice 
    5.1. The Macro Point of View: democratization, power-sharing and  
 development
 5.2. The Meso Point of View: pros and cons of decentralized governance as   
 conflict prevention tool
6.  Conclusions and Further Research
7.  Bibliography  
9 2 .  thE CoNtExt :  From  
 INtErNAtIoNAl CoNFlICts  
 to humAN sECurIty 
To initiate our discussion, we feel it is important to draw attention to several items 
in international relations which currently shape the global environment and, conse-
quently, our evaluation of the topic at hand.  The end of the Cold War has given way 
to several key changes, which have been further impacted by the evolution of globali-
zation, such as the transformation of the concept of international security, the emer-
gence of new armed conflicts, and the deepening of economic inequality and social 
exclusion. The global community has also been reformed through an international 
convergence of agendas concerning peace, security and development. There has been 
a shift in the main reference point, whereby there is a greater focus on individuals 
and communities, which is enacted through concepts such as human security and the 
“responsibility to protect.”  
Evidence of such global phenomena is witnessed through the observation of con-
flict trends in recent years. There have been a relatively small number of major armed 
conflicts (about thirty a year); however, by the fact that the majority of these conflicts 
are internal conflicts, there exists a constant risk of violence and conflict reemerging. 
Many of these intern conflicts are fought over access to state power and claims to au-
tonomy, as well as being defined by secession movements. Moreover, some of these 
conflicts become internationalized.
Secondly, we are reminded that security is understood as multidimensional so-
cietal, political, economic, environmental and military processes, which involve new 
risks and threats to newly defined groups.  Tools which observe such processes of 
securitization and politicization are now also required in order to understand such 
new types of conflict.  Thirdly, we would like to draw attention to the importance of 
the growing convergence of agendas and the international cooperation on ideas of 
peace, security and development. This convergence often revolves around the notions 
of “human security” and “human development” (a process, according to Amartya Sen 
that improves the wellbeing of the individual, their life options and enhances their 
capacity to make a better life for him/herself). 
Regarding the socioeconomic dimension, what matters most in a contempo-
rary global setting is the growth of economic inequality and social exclusion.  The 
Global South continues to face the deterioration of structural conditions, affecting 
many groups and individuals. This damaging fact exacerbates the risk of violence 
and potentially leads to the rise of asymmetric conflicts. Additionally, the process of 
urbanization aggravates issues of disparity, potentially leading to further grievances. 
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In 2008, for the first time in history, the majority of the world’s population lived in 
cities. This phenomenon will continue to be accentuated, and by 2015 it is expected 
that 79% of the European population will live in cities, 80% of Latin America, 81% of 
the American population, and 47% of the Asian and African populations. These social 
transformations will most probably impact and create further problems of social co-
hesion and generate new economic challenges. This new reality will in turn effect the 
management of conflicts arising from economic inequality.
The various factors mentioned above, currently defining global relations, have 
once again drawn our attention to two major features of contemporary conflict ma-
nagement, namely conflict prevention and peacebuilding. These two elements, which 
carry a lot of importance each in their own right, are also very much intertwined: on 
the one hand, conflict prevention aims at avoiding wars and/or preventing the recu-
rrence of wars once they have occurred; on the other hand, peacebuilding does not 
seek to eliminate conflict (which is impossible), rather it intends to develop effective 
mechanisms by which a polity can resolve its rival grievances, claims and competi-
tions in a peaceful manner.  
In other words, we understand both Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding as 
processes of profound change and structural transformations (thus focusing on the 
root causes of violent behavior), which is what the European Union has calls “struc-
tural stability.” This refers to the internalization of mechanisms for peaceful change 
allowing for the emergence of suitable institutions which will be able to meet basic 
needs and respect human rights, as we shall later observe. The creation, enhance-
ment or strengthening of legitimate and reliable mechanisms to resolve conflicts 
without violence, typically involves creating spaces or arenas for political and insti-
tutional processes. The following box summarizes the definition and history of pea-
cebuilding.  
 box 4:  orIGINs AND DEFINItIoN oF PEACEbuIlDING 
The term ‘peacebuilding’ came into widespread use after 1992 when Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, then United Nations Secretary-General, announced his Agenda 
for Peace (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Since then, ‘peacebuilding’ has become a broad-
ly used but often ill-defined term connoting activities that go beyond crisis inter-
vention such as longer-term development, and building of governance structures 
and institutions. It includes building the capacity of non-governmental organiza-
tions (including religious institutions) for peacemaking and peacebuilding. The 
emphasis of the United Nations has been on structural transformation, with a 
primary focus on institutional reform.
Peacebuilding involves a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed 
for transformation toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships and govern-
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ance modes and structures. Peacebuilding includes building legal and human 
rights institutions as well as fair and effective governance and dispute resolution 
processes and systems. To be effective, peacebuilding activities requires careful 
and participatory planning, coordination among various efforts, and sustained 
commitments by both local and donor partners. To summarize a construction 
metaphor used by Lederach, peacebuilding involves a long-term commitment to 
a process that includes investment, gathering of resources and materials, archi-
tecture and planning, coordination of resources and labour, laying solid foun-
dations, construction of walls and roofs, finish work and ongoing maintenance. 
Lederach also emphasizes that peacebuilding centrally involves the transforma-
tion of relationships. “Sustainable reconciliation” requires both structural and 
relational transformations (Lederach, 1997).
Precisely at this point is where we find an overall trend towards decentralization in 
countries both of the North and the South. The causal factors of such a global phe-
nomena appear to be due to the impact of one or more of the following (Sharma, 
2005): a) the processes of democratization: the movement began in the seventies and 
during the eighties and nineties it was followed by a strong wave of decentralization 
processes; b) economic development: the erosion of the power of the central govern-
ment as result of globalization has given further value to territory and has, therefore, 
endowed subnational governments, cities and regions with new and crucial roles and 
functions in governance (simultaneously, there has been an increase in economic 
drivers and an interest in innovation); and c) political heterogeneity and conflicting 
demands: many experts express that the most important and significant factors are 
the demand for autonomy and the request for powersharing arrangements, which act 
as the root cause for many decentralization processes.
Exogenous pressure has also been partially responsible for the increasing global 
trend in decentralization. Box 5 shows us how international organizations, particu-
larly in the context of cooperation for development, have notoriously promoted de-
centralization.
 box 5: rolE oF INtErNAtIoNAl orGANIzAtIoNs IN thE  
 PromotIoN oF DECENtrAlIzAtIoN 
The support and pressure of international organizations for decentralized 
governance can in part explain the extent of this global, political trend.  Many 
developing countries have opted to embrace policies that promote decentral-
ized governance due to the direction and/ or suggestion of institutions such as 
the European Commission or the World Bank. Many international donors also 
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favour decentralization movements and they have proceeded to include such ref-
ormations as a condition for obtaining funds. The European Commission, above 
the promotion of decentralization among its members and beyond upholding 
the principle of subsidiarity, also devotes a large amount of funds to promote 
processes of decentralization and local governance. An example of this support 
is the EU-Africa Lisbon Summit Declaration (December 2007), which in section 
II declares the following “To facilitate and promote a broad-based and people-
centered partnership wideranging, Africa and the EU will empower non-state 
actors and create conditions to enable them to play an active role in develop-
ment, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 
processes.” (European Commission, 2007)
The World Bank presents a distinct approach. For the sake of effectiveness it 
demands that receiver countries reduce the weight of the central state.  It also 
requires that they expand the private sector, and look to strengthening subna-
tional government. To facilitate such progress the World Bank has developed 
the “Decentralization and Subnational Thematic Group”, which aims “to share 
information and deeper knowledge among a wide range of practitioners-macro, 
sectorial, urban, and rural-to bring about a more informed, consistent and com-
prehensive approach to decentralization and development in our Subnational 
country programs. The Thematic Group seeks to share knowledge and Deep on 
intergovernmental relations, regional development and poverty reduction, and 
central and local governance to enhance the effectiveness of multi-tier govern-
ments.” (World Bank’s Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network 
website)
In conclusion, the context described above shows that, while there is an increase in 
domestic violent conflicts, is not a coincidence that a new wave of decentralization is 
underway. Many countries, since the year 2000 have been implementing, or at least 
discussing, reforms towards decentralization. This trend led Manor to the conclusion 
that “decentralization has quietly become a fashion of our time. It is being consid-
ered or attempted in an astonishing diversity of developing, developer and transi-
tional countries, by solvent and insolvent regimes, by democracies (both mature and 
emergent) and autocracies, by regimes making the transition to democracy and by 
other seeking to avoid that transition, by regimes which varied colonial inheritance 
and which none. It is being attempted where civil society is strong, a where is weak” 
(Manor, 1999: 12).  
We will now focus on the conceptual and analytical framework part of this paper, 
which deals specifically with grounded attempts to prevent violence and war, taking 
a particular look at cases where new conflicts, the so-called ‘emerging conflicts’, are 
arising.
13
 3 .  rEsEArCh AND wAr/vIolENCE  
 PrEvENtors 
The desire, both academic and political, to prevent wars has always been accompa-
nied by the debate surrounding the causes of wars. Thus, the primary focus of this 
paper is how to achieve peaceful social and political change given the emergence of 
new causes for conflicts.  
One of the responses to the challenges posed by the possible materialization of 
war was the birth of peace research in the fifties. The goal of peace researchers was 
to reform the International Relations field to find out the causes of war and condi-
tions for peace. During the second half of the twentieth century, peace research has 
been significantly altered; Oliver Richmond has called it the “transformation of peace 
from the matrix of the liberal peace” (Richmond, 2008).   Concretely, there has been 
a “hybridisation of the different discourses of peace and their associated actors that 
has lead to a contemporary understanding of liberal peace as constituted by different 
forms of governance and within the forces of globalization. This has come to be cons-
tituted in a peacebuilding consensus” (Richmond 2008: 83).
Within this working framework, the mainstream attempts to understand the cau-
ses of war and violence translated into a coordinated search for what would be the 
most suitable preventors of war. According to Miall “a cause of war is a factor that 
brings war about. In a similar way, a ‘preventor’ is a factor that tends to preserve pea-
ce, at least in the negative sense” (Miall 2007: 15), in the sense of the absence of a war. 
Therefore, a preventor implies a positive element, something to be achieved; it is not 
merely the absence of violence. The causes and preventors of war can be understood 
as a causal factor of bringing about an effect. Thus, a preventor has the capacity to 
bring about the non-ocurrence of a war.
However, can we analyze and discuss the causes and preventors of war and vio-
lence from a unitary starting point; either the single-cause or the single-preventor? 
The current study and practice of Peace Research –together with the analytical fra-
mework and data used for this paper— have shown that conflicts are always multifa-
ceted: not a single war or armed conflict can be attributed solely to one causal factor, 
although it may be that during a particular phase of a conflict one causal factor might 
dominate. An important distinction should be made between distant causes (factors 
and items with some influence, albeit very indirectly) and direct causes. Moreover, it 
is necessary that we conceptually distinguish between several sorts of causes:
• Immediate (triggers) or underlying causes (which can be structural causes), given 
its relation with the outbreak of conflicts.
• Efficient (accelerators or triggers, which can be regarded as specific causes for a 
particular case) or permissive causes (external conditions, for example the inter-
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national system, which could be responsible for the outbreak of hostilities), given 
its degree of responsibility to the conflict.  
• Necessary (which must be present for a conflict to be triggered, along with other 
causal factors) and sufficient causes (root causes which explain the basic reason 
for the outbreak of the war or violence).  
When addressing causation, and taking into account the methodological guidelines 
which were just outlined, it is suggested that Peace Research and Conflict Resolution 
should distinguish between three types of causation: 
• Structural causes, that is, necessary causes, such as relative deprivation or grave 
injustices prevalent in asymmetric conflicts, which serve as the basis and founda-
tion for greed or grievance upon which a particular side or group can build a case. 
Without them there would be no conflict, but often these factors do not lead to 
violent behavior.
• Accelerators or intermediate causes (causes, facilitators, conductors), which allow 
for the exacerbation and the advancement of hostilities.
• Triggers or immediate causes (the drop that fills the cup), which explains the out-
break of violence after a phase of escalation and the presence of structural causes. 
In other words, the causal factors for war are present at, at least three different levels, 
each needing to be analyzed separately: firstly, the background level or structural 
context needs to be observed; then, the middle level or factors present at close prox-
imity (accelerators) and, finally, the immediate level (triggers).   
If we apply this knowledge to the matter at hand, then the task of understanding 
the causes of war as well as the conditions which are required to avoid it (causes and 
preventors) becomes clear. The following conclusions can be drawn concerning the 
causes and preventors of war based on the aforementioned evaluation (Miall, 2007).
 box 6: CAusEs AND PrEvENtors oF wAr 
• Causes of war will normally only be effective when they operate together, in 
particular contexts (accelerators) and given particular conditions (trigger 
conditions).
• Similarly, preventors of war normally need to act in combination and often 
may depend on contingent conditions.
• Just as the causes, we can —we must— look for preventors at different levels: 
structural, proximate and immediate
• Causes and preventors, in short, are not exclusive categories. They co-exist. 
There are examples of societies with a long tradition of peaceful relations and 
peaceful change which, nevertheless, are now at war.
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Therefore, in accordance with what has been the standard practice for centuries and 
in congruence with mainstream thinking in peace research and conflict resolution 
studies, the task of achieving peaceful change is possible in any society if a combina-
tion of different types of violence preventors is applied. It is not mere wishful or uto-
pian thinking to believe that war can be prevented. Rather, it has been demonstrated 
in recent history by the realities of societies which make up security communities for 
example (i.e. Scandinavia) as well as by those which have avoided war for long peri-
ods. This is shown by the fact that some sixty countries, for at least sixty years, have 
not gone to war with each other.
If we consider very long historical cycles (over the course of centuries), there is 
evidence that social change has always occurred through a combination of peace-
ful and violent change. Numerous macroanalytical, historical and sociological wor-
ks (Charles Tilly, for example) show that the actor, who has most often resorted to 
violence is the state, particularly during processes of state formation, expansion and 
consolidation. Other studies and analyses, meso or micro in nature, have shown that 
the majority of societies have simultaneously experienced both peaceful and violent 
transformations. This point is very relevant to the subject because shows that the 
issue-areas which prompt violence also change themselves with social conditions 
(Luard,1986). There is therefore, a growing consensus which leads us to formulate 
the following argument: in most societies peaceful and violent change coexist and, 
provided that social conditions are altered, new sources of conflict emerge (or emer-
ging conflicts could involve the reappearance of violence and past grievances).
However, even in such cases where the possibility of violent conflicts emerging 
is imminent, there are practices and instruments (preventors) which allow for the 
extension of the domain of peaceful change vis-à-vis violent change. For this result 
to be achieved, it is essential to know in which dimensions the preventors should 
occur, so that social processes of transformation and accommodation may take place 
peacefully.
As we already touched upon, modern-day armed conflicts in the post-Cold War 
era are mostly internal, domestic in nature, and are located primarily in the Global 
South, where recently or even over the last centuries violent change has dominated 
over peaceful change. To alter this fact, whereby the causes for this imbalance are 
modified in order to benefit peaceful change, three main areas or dimensions where 
preventors can be located and consolidated must be identified. 
There are three elements which are essential to promote processes of peaceful 
social change, to the extent that institutions and relationships are agreed upon in 
order to manage inevitable social conflicts. The first is democratization and ins-
titutional design, which focus on the institutional policies and procedures for re-
source allocation and the resolution of potential disputes. The second crucial factor is 
development; this pays attention to structural changes, in seeking to reduce imba-
lances, improve the welfare of individuals, communities and social groups and seeks 
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to reduce the maximum inequality and social exclusion possible. The final element 
is good governance, which includes various incentives for political inclusion and 
power sharing arrangements. These three areas remain consistent with the analytical 
framework outlined in the introduction, especially if we take into account that two 
of them, democratization and good governance fit into our institutional choice and 
‘peace as governance’ as short- and mid-term approaches, and that the third, develo-
pment relates to the long-term structural changes.
These elements, which could be understood in terms of causality, can be repre-
sented graphically following Miall. The long-term attempt to change the status quo 
and conflicts are difficult to manage at the national, state, international or global level 
because their policies do not have the capacity to exclude the risk of polarization and 
violence.
 box 7: rEsults oF soCIAl ChANGE 
New forms of conflict generate new clashes, conflicts of interest, and incompatibilities, 
which may well evolve towards polarization and escalation, or conversely, towards 
negotiation and accommodation, thus transforming the conflict.   This transforma-
tion can take the shape of peaceful or violent change. The path taken will depend on 
the external context (national, state, international or global level) which can promote 
either peaceful or violent change. The specific dynamic of the conflict, actors, incom-
patibilities and behaviors are also affected by the national or global environment in 
which the conflict is situated. The conflict, therefore, depends on the social capacity 
to manage, resolve and transform a volatile situation, as well as on the existence and 
the internalization of effective preventors. The capacity to improve the conflict envi-
ronment -so that peace may be achieved or maintained- is also subject to the techni-
cal cooperation and the work of international organizations.
However, according to Miall’s model, often these preventors operate in a more 
subtle and nuanced manner in the real word. They do not exist in a binary fashion; 
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not least because, as Tilly (among others) has demonstrated, peaceful or violent 
change is largely dependent on the ability of key players to mobilize society towards 
violence or towards peace (Tilly, 2003). Therefore, it is necessary that we refine the 
analysis, as shown in the box.  
 box 8: Four PAths oF soCIAl ChANGE 
The figure offers a reformed model with four identified alternatives. When social 
changes occur (such as uneven development, a change in the status or the relative 
position of some ethnic groups, a transition of power, the introduction of a new 
production model or religious belief system), this can lead to an ‘emerging conflict’. 
The first alternative, which is prevalent in many cases, simply leads to new or refur-
bished corrective relations or relations of domination and / or coercion.  Therefore, 
in a structural conflict -where underlying, asymmetrical relation are prevalent- the 
hegemony or the use of coercive means ensure dominance is maintained. In other 
cases, demonstrated by the second path, the perception of conflicting interests may 
lead to the emergence of feelings of hostility and polarization, thus resulting in politi-
cal mobilization and eventually violent conflict.  On the contrary, and depicted by 
the third path, political mobilization may also lead to the organization of negotia-
tions about the distribution of resources and power through the establishment of 
new political processes.  Negotiations and efforts to implement new political arrange-
ments, in a typical situation of mixed cooperation and conflict, however, do not nec-
essarily exclude the possibility of a sudden outbreak of violence. Finally, there is a 
fourth alternative which can be selected, sometimes after the third alternative has 
been tried. The parties involved manage a deeper collaboration, genuine coopera-
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tion, and are able to transform the emerging conflict in a manner that is mutually 
beneficial to all parties.  The likelihood of violence in the present and/ or the future is 
reduced. In this case one can speak of positive peace.
To conclude, the analytical framework can be summarized as follows: 
• Research on peace and conflict resolution show that peaceful social change is pos-
sible, with no violence or very small amounts, even when conditions for emerging 
conflicts are present.
• In order for such a form of peace to be guaranteed, the success of conflict pre-
ventors in the three core areas, development -to avoid, as shown in Box 8, the 
persistence of structural inequalities-, democratization and institutional design, 
and lastly, good governance and mechanisms of power-sharing are all necessary.
This is precisely where the link between conflict prevention and decentralized gov-
ernance comes into the picture, as a way of fostering good governance and a better 
institutional setting.
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 4 .  thE CoNCEPtuAl FrAmEwork  
 AND oPErAtIoNAl DEFINIt IoNs:  
 CoNFlICt PrEvENtIoN AND  
 DECENtrAlIzED GovErNANCE 
We are now going to offer brief operational definitions in order to better understand 
the connection between both concepts.
Conflict prevention, the desire of preventing wars and violent behavior, is not 
new. However, it has changed shape since the end of Cold War. Forums on the issue 
of conflict prevention have multiplied the since the 90s, and the subject has been 
discussed and debated by politicians, secretary generals and by the heads of inter-
national organizations (directed in large part by the United Nations). Academics, 
members of major private foundations have also addressed this issue, as well as 
activists and members of civil society. In addition, specialized institutions have 
emerged, which have conducted very important studies on the subject matter, such 
as the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict or through the work led 
by the International Crisis Group. For example, in the late nineties the United States 
Institute of Peace developed a Task Force on conflict prevention and the Council on 
Foreign Relations created a Center for Preventive Action, all dedicated to this issue. 
It can further be concluded that emphasis in this field has been placed on conflict 
prevention, more so than conflict management.  
All of those listed above have significantly contributed to the current working de-
finition of conflict prevention, although, without a doubt, one of the most impacting 
references (both political and academic) was described in former UN Secretary Ge-
neral, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali 1992).  This report 
redefined the idea of preventive diplomacy created in 1960 by Dag Hammarskjöld 
and adapted it to the context of the post-Cold War. In the Agenda Boutros-Ghali re-
fers to preventive diplomacy as a policy that was aimed at preventing conflicts from 
emerging, and also from escalating into violence. He discusses five specific measures; 
confidence-building, fact-finding missions, early-warning networks, preventive de-
ployment and demilitarized zones. He also held that it was necessary to confront the 
underlying causes of violent conflicts through economic and social development.
Regarding ‘conflict prevention’, it exists a clear consensus on the definition, which is 
illustrated through Lund’s classic definition.
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 box 9: DEFINItIoN oF CoNFlICt PrEvENtIoN 
Conflict prevention refers to “ any structural or intercessory means to keep intr-
astate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence 
and the use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties 
to violent for resolving such disputes peacefully and to progressively reduce the 
underlying problems that produce the issues and disputes” (Lund, 2002: 117)
Lund’s definition of conflict prevention is consistent with Boutros-Ghali’s ideas pre-
viously presented, through four main points: a) the type of intervention required may 
be temporarily limited or broad; b) it seeks to prevent the emergence of violence and 
intends to manage the escalation and or mitigation of violence; c) it seeks to enhance 
the capacities of the parties or stakeholders; and d) it emphasizes the importance 
of addressing, at some point, the underlying problems that generate disputes and 
problems.
In the’90s two major topics of scholarly debate on the matter emerged. The first, 
suggestion offered by some was to limit conflict prevention by focusing on non-
escalatory, early stages of the conflict.  In other words their proposal neglected the 
escalation and post-conflict stages of the outbreak of violence (Ackerman 2002, Lea-
therman 1999). Although it is believed here that prevention can reach the stage of 
hostility as well as the post-conflict, this article will apply a narrower definition of 
conflict prevention, which is pre-empting the eruption of violence. Thus, we are going 
to reduce our focus to the early stages of the conflict. The second topic of discussion 
focuses on the causation of conflict, namely the controversy about which objectives 
should be pursued or what should be the focus in the attempt to prevent conflict: 
“Light versus deep prevention” (Miall, 2007) or “operational versus structural pre-
vention” (Carnegie Commission, 1997).
In sum, the overarching issue of debate is whether conflict prevention should fo-
cus on eliminating the root or structural causes for conflict, or concentrate on more 
short and medium term goals (what we called accelerators and triggers). In this stu-
dy, we accept that deep-rooted causes of conflicts must be addressed, but it is argued 
that, in order to achieve peaceful social transformation, preventing the outbreak of 
violent, immediate causal factors must be awarded priority. Nonetheless, it remains 
vital to incorporate a peacebuilding approach, characterized by the transformation of 
the underlying, structural causes.  In this approach, which remains consistent with 
the one developed above, the core areas of conflict prevention are institutional design 
and governance, leaving the deeper, long-term issues for development to tackle.
Decentralization, as a concept, is more complex to define and, specifically, in 
its particular form of decentralized governance. But before turning to the field of ter-
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minology, it should be remembered that in this paper it is assumed that decentrali-
zation is a mechanism or procedure, a tool to share power and divide responsibilities 
with the objective of improving the living conditions of  citizens. If such political dis-
tribution functions then decentralization can be expected to prevent the emergence 
of violent conflict and / or minimize the risks of non-peaceful change. We return to 
this relationship later.
In other words, to talk of decentralization, despite its many nuances, is to talk 
about political power and government levels and how these are constructed.  For 
example the reorganization of the state through the transfer or devolution of res-
ponsibilities to subnational levels of government is a topic of decentralization.  It 
remains a topic of institutional choice and design, systems of democracy and types 
of governance
 box 10: DEFINItIoN oF DECENtrAlIzAtIoN 
“Decentralization is not about the downsizing or dismantling of central govern-
ment; rather, it calls for mutually supportive democratic central and local gov-
ernance. [...] Decentralization is any act in which a central government formally 
cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administra-
tive and territorial hierarchy” (Ribot, 2002).
“Decentralisation refers to the restructuring or reorganization of authority so 
that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at 
the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity, 
thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of governance, 
while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels” (UNDP, 
1999) 
Naturally, the process of strengthening and improving sub-governmental systems 
consists of the devolution of political, administrative and financial power away from 
the central government. Without being exhaustive, it is worth briefly reviewing the 
different types and sizes of decentralization processes.
Political decentralization refers to alterations to the structure of government 
through the devolution of power and authority to lower levels of government.  It is 
also associated with powersharing through the recognition of federal principles, au-
tonomous regions and the like. Political decentralization also includes procedures to 
increase the participation of citizens and of civil society in their selection of gover-
nmental representatives and in political decision-making (Cheema and Rondinelli, 
2007).  The objective is that lower levels of government become accountable to the 
public.  
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Administrative decentralization involves the devolution of bureaucratic structures 
away from the central government to lower levels of power, without removing their 
accountability to the central government. The effective decentralization of the gov-
ernmental administrative body requires that local and regional governments have 
the ability to establish ordinances and regulation or bylaws, which they consider to 
be appropriate within their jurisdictions.  Furthermore, it necessitates that there is 
no central control on matters of internal functioning (such as hiring and firing staff) 
(Shah and Thompson, 2004).
Finally, we come to fiscal decentralization, which entails the agreed upon means 
by which revenue is shared between levels of government, including the delegation of 
tax collection and public expenditure.
At this point, we would like to include a note on the more general debate about 
decentralization: how to carry out decentralization and what kind of power transfer 
to non-central governmental institutions should take place first. Following Sharma, 
box 11 contains this two-pronged discussion (Sharma, 2008).
 box 11: how to DECENtrAlIzE? 
One of the debates in this area is related to the order and the speed at which it acts 
of decentralization should be implemented. There exists a major issue regard-
ing the implementation of decentralization processes refers to where it should 
start. Some experts believe it is necessary to initiate the process in the political 
sphere because without the institutionalized capacity for action and the political 
know-how fiscal decentralization, for example, is meaningless (Boex, 2001). At 
the other extreme there are the proponents who such suggest that initiating the 
process with fiscal decentralization, as they believe that political decentralization 
without the proper resources is not possible (Blanchard and  Schleifer, 2000).  
Secondly, we encounter the discussion on the manner of how to carry out decen-
tralization, should the process be gradual or sudden. Some experts advocate the 
need to implement changes in a phased manner (a slow and incremental deploy-
ment of decentralization policies); this thinking is based on the importance of 
the learning curve of the actors involved in and impacted by such changes. This 
approach would allow alterations and adjustments during the process of decen-
tralization (Prud’homme, 2001). Conversely, there are those who favour a big 
bang approach to ensure that the process is not stalled because of the establish-
ment of alliances between actors who opposed decentralization due to the per-
ception that it may impact them negatively (Sato, 2002).
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Regarding the different types of powersharing, the literature tends to distinguish 
between three basic sorts of powersharing or, more specifically, three levels of 
depth. The first, and lowest in intensity, of these types is deconcentration, which 
is the territorial dispersion of central power through the shift in the responsibility 
for implementing governmental decisions away from the central government. With 
deconcentration, this small transfer of power does not usually go to an elected repre-
sentative presiding over the territory, but to an appointed official, meaning that the 
central government maintains control over resources and prioritized tasks. Secondly, 
there is delegation, which refers to transfer capacities to non-central governmental 
institutions in issues/areas where these levels already have competences, but being 
responsible to central governments. Lastly, we find devolution, which is a full transfer 
of responsibilities to lower levels of government, thus allowing them to freely exercise 
the authority and carry out their functions (which should be legally stipulated), based 
on the confidence that the central government places in the non-central governments 
(Siegle and O’Mahony, 2007).
These forms or levels of decentralization occur in many areas of public policy, and 
the given result of the decentralization process is different with each type. Given the 
multiplicity of players, fields and formulas, it is not possible to speak of a single mo-
del or a universal recipe for decentralization. Consequently, another point of debate 
and reflection is how to attain a suitable balance. The result of the decentralization 
process depends on many factors. But the question remains, how to find a lasting 
balance? It is impossible to find an equilibrium given the fact that societies change, 
evolve and adapt to new realities.
On the other hand, it is worth remembering that the processes of decentralization 
cannot rest solely on the structures of the state. Participation is indispensable and a 
healthy balance between the public and the private sector is also required. In short, 
to apply a political-philosophical metaphor, a functioning decentralized system de-
mands an equilibrium between the prince, the merchant and the citizen. 
In other words, one can speak of the existence of a creative tension that moves at 
the same speed as society and the actors in it.  Accordingly, the degree of decentrali-
zation and the size of the state will depend on the relationship between economies of 
scale -which favours the existence of large, centralized states- and the heterogeneity 
of the population and its needs -which tends to favour small states and further decen-
tralization (Alesina and Spolare, 2003).  
This is where decentralized governance comes into play. Remember that until 
the early eighties, it was generally regarded that state and government were quasi-
synonymous or interchangeable, but in the late eighties and early nineties, governan-
ce began to symbolize something other than the government. It has been said that 
the concept has evolved along three stages. In the first phase, the focus was placed 
on deconcentrating hierarchical governmental structures and bureaucracies.  In the 
second stage, transpiring in the mid-eighties, the concept was expanded to include 
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political power sharing, democratization and market liberalization, implying that the 
decision makers were already situated within the private sector.  In the latest sta-
ge, since the nineties, decentralization became defined as wider public participation 
through the organization of civil society “(Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).
The concept of governance was, therefore, expanded to include not only gover-
nmental bodies but also other social institutions, particularly the lucrative private 
sector and civil society. Evidently, hand in hand with the expansion of the meaning of 
governance and the inclusion of new players, conceptual changes also occurred at the 
regarding the understanding of decentralization; it adopted new forms and meanings. 
Generally the consolidation of these changes refers to decentralized governance.
For operational purposes therefore, decentralized governance, in this text will be 
understood as mechanisms and efforts taking place in all three dimensions of decen-
tralization (political, financial and administrative) with the objective of devolution or 
powersharing between different governmental institutions, including actors in the 
private and public sectors.  
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 5 .  thE stAtE oF thE Art :  two  
 PoINts oF vIEw oN thE thEory  
 AND PrACtICE 
In our investigation we refer to a series of books and articles that offer different per-
spectives and approaches on to the conceptual and methodological aspects of the 
relationship between conflict prevention, decentralization or decentralized govern-
ance. These sources also offer assessments of a variety of case studies, evaluating the 
performance and outcomes of concrete experiences. We will review in this section 
the results of these sources, particularly the more meaningful findings. We have con-
ducted our evaluation of the literature on decentralization and conflict prevention in 
two manners, specifically, macro and meso approaches:
• The first approach is a macro view of the relationship between the two phenomena. 
From the notion of peace and the proposals of peace research, we focus specifically 
on three major areas: democratic design and peace governance; power- sharing; 
and, finally, the pursuit of human development, as was outlined in the first sec-
tions of this paper. Here, therefore, we offer a brief analysis of the studies and the 
analysis that are only indirectly concerned with the relationship between conflict 
prevention and decentralized governance. 
• The second approach focuses on the meso elements of the connection.  Applying 
the same assumptions and principles about the notion of peace and the proposals 
of peace research, the meso perspective focuses on the pros and cons discussed in 
the literature directly oriented to the study of decentralization and its particular 
impact on conflict prevention. 
In both cases, the analytical framework is the same: to deconstruct and reconstruct 
the arguments made in order to observe the possible positive and negative impacts in 
terms of causes and preventors. They both focus on the underlying structural causes, 
intermediate causes, as well as triggers or accelerators of conflict.
 5.1. thE mACro PoINt oF vIEw: DEmoCrAtIzAtIoN, PowEr-shArING   
 AND DEvEloPmENt 
We will focus on three macro perspectives of cases whereby countries find them-
selves in transition, emerging from armed conflicts or in situations of asymmetric 
conflict (without violence or warfare). Specifically, we will focus on the institution-
al design (democratization and democracy), power-sharing incentives and human 
development.
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The first analytical perspective focuses on the politics of institutional choice in con-
flict-torn societies.  It takes a particular look at “democracy designs” defined by tran-
sitions to democracy, especially in cases of decentralization. Although there has been 
much written on the subject, we have chosen to concentrate on the work of Bastian 
and Luckham 2003, because they offer a balanced outlook on the design of democracy 
and democratization. They argue that far from considering that the process is a “gen-
eral panacea, an adjunct of capitalism or device for engineering solutions to political 
and social problems, including conflict (...) we regard democracy as a value in its own 
right ... The emphasis is placed upon how democratic institutions can be reformed to 
ensure they deliver democratic governance” (Bastian and Luckham, 2003: 1-2). In 
short, they pose the question, can democracy be designed?  The perspective is very 
interesting for us because, as the authors show, democratic institutions and elected 
governments may or may not open spaces for democratic politics; they may or not 
may facilitate the managements of conflicts. “Furthermore, the institutional devices 
selected by constitution makers seldom function quite in the way intended: a case in 
point is how an electoral system designed to foster inter-ethnic accommodation had 
the precisely opposite effect, in Fiji” (Bastian and Luckham, 2003: 3).
These authors conduct their research through six case studies: South Africa, 
Uganda, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ghana and Fiji. The first four are si-
milar in the fact that they have just suffered from a major armed conflict or are still 
involved in one. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, peace was imposed from the outside 
and the result was a very nascent and insufficient form of democracy.  In Sri Lanka, 
political negotiations and military operations against insurgents have not yet finis-
hed, nor were they resolved in the year this study was completed. The other two, Fiji 
and Ghana, which display situations in which there is a general lack of democracy, 
and military rule and episodic violence are prevalent, but there is not a major armed 
conflict present.  
The authors analyze the cases with a common methodology, having placed them 
in their respective historical contexts. They then carry out their evaluation at three 
levels:   
• They question how broad principles of democratic governance, as well the desire 
to prevent conflict, were translated into specific institutional choices in particular 
national contexts, and other such questions are addressed; 
• They offer an analysis of the structure of new or redesigned democratic institu-
tions and their actual operation, including an evaluation of power-sharing arran-
gements and incentives; and
• They assess the impact of democratic reforms, in areas such as the reduction or the 
elimination of identity or ethno-political conflicts, the promotion of participation 
and the respect for minority rights (Bastian and Luckham, 2003:4).
The richness of the whole study —the simultaneous analysis of two cases, Sri Lanka 
and Fiji, regarding the reinvention of democratic institutions, which was done to 
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resolve or prevent violent conflict, four transitions or attempted transitions to democ-
racy— makes it very difficult to summarize the findings.
We would like to address, however, four specific allegations. First, there is no ge-
neric answer to the question of whether democracy can be designed? If there was, it 
would be negative: democratic constitutions do not guarantee democracy, even if well 
formulated, it cannot guarantee the non-violent resolution of conflicts. This is even 
more true for countries like Sri Lanka or Fiji, for example, which have a long and pro-
blematic history of “constitutional experiment in multi-ethnic societies” (Bastian and 
Luckham, 2003: 304). Second, despite this statement, “there is sometimes no serious 
alternative to designing or redesigning democratic institutions”. Often the obstacle, 
the reason because they do not resolve conflicts, is that the existing designs do not 
address the root causes of reducing inequality and asymmetry, or because the basic 
structures of the state have collapsed, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina (or in Uganda before 
1986 ). “The real issue is how it can be reinvented, by whom and with what prospect 
(however meagre) of success” (Bastian and Luckham, 2003: 305). 
Third, there are many solutions to the diverse problems of each case.  There is 
never a single option; institutional choices can be made in a great variety of ways 
“(Bastian and Luckham, 2003: 305). Fourth, for several reasons and in many ways, 
context and history are key factors and will be essential to the success, to bringing 
about lasting peace. In short, the bringing about of democracy does not occur in an 
economic or political vacuum. The implementation and design of democracy is often 
restricted by that who manages it. In other words, the shape of the reforms almost 
always displays features which can be explained by who the designer was: the desig-
ner works usually pro domo sua. 
The last point that we would like to address relates directly the theme of our stu-
dy. The view of the authors is clear: “institutional reform for conflict resolution is 
necessarily an open-ended process.” In their opinion, a) the strategies and procedu-
res for power-sharing and decentralize in order to prevent violence are varied and 
the results are very different in each case; b) the success or failure depends in part 
on the context and the coherence between different policies and actions, and c) ·de-
centralization, in all conflict-torn societies, is not a panacea, and must be tailored to 
the specific requirements of peace building in the country’s particular nation context 
(Bastian and Luckham, 2003: 310-11). 
Let us now shift our analysis to the second standpoint, which corresponds to the 
approach we have called, “peace as governance, power-sharing arrangements, with 
a focus on the incentives for inclusion, and participation, which is being offered to 
armed groups in contemporary peace negotiations. In other words, we looked for stu-
dies which concentrated on ‘Peacemaking and Peacebuilding’ strategies; we  would 
like to specifically address the work of Chandra Lekha Sriram, (Sriram, 2008), for 
her work offers in-depth field research in three very different cases, Colombia, Sudan 
and Sri Lanka. In all three cases the armed groups were offered inclusion within the 
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structures of power and government. The study also has two additional features that 
make it especially interesting: a) it offers a critical perspective on the foundations 
of proposals of peace as governance, the “liberal peacebuilding consensus”, and b) 
from a broadened and more applicable view, she conceptualizes power-sharing as an 
incentive which relies on the explicit institutionalization of the state and on the use 
of state institutions. (Sriram, 2008: 2-5). In short, she states that governance incen-
tives also include non-traditional incentives, such as resource-sharing, inclusion into 
state or regional security structures, territorial autonomy, including several forms of 
decentralized governance.  
Sriram questions whether armed groups should be included in the post-war sett-
lement and power-sharing arrangements, and she formulates her response via an 
in-depth exploration into the case studies listed above. Specifically, her research in-
volves a critical examination of one of the most common contemporary strategies of 
peacemaking and peacebuilding, which is that of power-sharing. Sriram’s analyzes 
the promises and the limits of governance incentives, incentives which, according to 
the liberal peacebuilding consensus, encourage armed groups to negotiate and imple-
ment peace agreements.
Her final thesis, remaining consistent with other such investigations, concludes 
that power-sharing and similar incentives can often reify existing cleavages within 
societies, increasing rather than decreasing the risk of violent conflict. (Sriram, 2008: 
1-6).  Power-sharing may end up importing or embedding social divisions, making 
chronic conflicts more likely, because the new institutions of governance may end up 
being dysfunctional or too weak to manage emerging conflicts. An example, in the 
words of Sriram, is the creation of new conflicts, or the stoking of existing conflicts, 
“where power-sharing excludes significant parties or interests: some Muslims in Sri 
Lanka, persistently excluded from the formal negotiating process, have become in-
creasingly radicalized, and may see violence as the only route to staking a claim in any 
future negotiations” (Sriram, 2008: 189).
Finally, in terms of constructive criticism, Sriram defends the need for more 
nuanced governance incentives (which are outlined below) to offset the risks arising 
from the “liberal peacebuilding consensus and the a prioris from traditional propo-
sals. Specifically, she proposed that the incentives offered to armed militias to engage 
in peace negotiations, agreements and to engage in implementation should be explo-
red, during the proposal, negotiation and implementation phase in four dimensions. 
The first should observe the direct involvement of armed groups in future political 
processes, through positions in government and through the creation of political par-
ties, etc. The second will evaluate the inclusion of former combatants into the security 
forces which, typically, have been reformed (in the case of Central America they are 
known as Policía Nacional Civil). This incentive solves two problems, the more ob-
vious is that it provides employment for those who will become demobilized in the 
future, and the less obvious is that it offers former militia a position within the state 
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apparatus. The third explored is resource-sharing, an incentive that usually takes two 
forms, offering an armed group direct economic benefits, or giving them a role in the 
governance of resources (Sriram, 2008: 182). Four and lastly, the incentive of terri-
torial autonomy should be observed, which includes the size and shape of a future 
region and its government, as well as a presented opportunity for referendum on 
independence.  This incentive offers the armed group the future opportunity to either 
govern directly, or to have direct access to the government in a specific area, through 
federal or other arrangements made within a larger state (Sriram, 2008: 182).  
Each of the four types of incentives carries with it its own strengths and weak-
nesses, challenges for negotiation and for implementation.  It furthermore, remains 
crucial that several recommendations to improve the outcomes which are made avai-
lable to for mediators and donors, in order “to  avoid the risk that governance incen-
tives may replicate existing patterns of social dominance, with elites (weather ethnic, 
caste, class, or other dominant groups) manipulating governance arrangement to 
maintain dominance” (Sriram, 2008: 190). In short, there is a risk that direct power-
sharing and similar incentives can often reify existing cleavage in societies. It there-
fore becomes vital that attention is paid to the root and structural causes, because the 
exclusive focus on the triggers or accelerators can complicate things in the medium 
or long term. As De Gaulle would say, this would be another case in point that any 
political solution begets a new problem.
The third perspective in the literature will be covered more briefly. It is an analy-
sis from ‘human development and the economy’. We have selected a major study on 
the relationship between globalization, self-determination and violent conflict: how 
global factors have affected violent conflicts and movement for self-determination, 
and, particularly, the international policy response to self-determinations and vio-
lent conflict. We now turn to the works of Valpy FitzGerald, Frances Stewart and 
Rajesh Venugopal (FitzGerald, Stewart and Venugopal, 2006). In their case studies 
on Congo, Somalia, Burma, Algeria and Sri Lanka, they consider the role of global 
actors (international organizations, for example), who are seeking to devise working 
alternatives. A large part of the proposals made by these actors, such as decentralized 
governance, intend to “help contain and channel the conflicts over self-determination 
toward less violent means, and reduce the incidence of violence on the poor and the 
vulnerable (…but this potential will require…) major changes in international institu-
tions, particularly a more central role for the United Nations as the only representati-
ve global institution” (FitzGerald, Stewart and Venugopal, 2006: 17).
This theoretical and conceptual work goes far beyond the usual analysis of “greed 
and grievance” as main causes of war and violence.  The guidelines outlined here for 
conflict prevention and decentralized governance emphasize the importance, albeit 
unusual, policy coherence, particularly the coherence with respect to bilateral and 
multilateral policies of donors in the North and in the South.
These authors show that there is room to build an alternative policy towards mo-
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vements of self-determination, by changing the behavior of the ‘global drivers’. They 
specifically point to the influence of the two major “global drivers:  the disaggregated 
and informal forces of economic and cultural globalization, on the one hand; and, 
secondly, the conscious policy responses to the “disorder” inherent in the global sys-
tem, in the areas of, finance, global norms, international law.  In addition, we are 
reminded that it is essential that global institutions are reformed, if indeed durable 
solutions are to be developed.  We must be radical, that is, go to the roots. In his 
own words: “a first step is to recognize that people have legitimate reasons for self-
determination and minorities need to have room to manage their lives and not be 
crushed by majorities (…). The second step is provide international support, which 
may occasionally include military intervention in order to make this principle effecti-
ve” (FitzGerald, Stewart and Venugopal, 2006: 257)
In short, these three views or point of views, which only partially and indirectly 
address the relationship between decentralized governance and conflict prevention, 
remind us that the success-even the ability to avoid collateral damage or the capacity 
to prevent aggravating things further in the medium and long term - depends on con-
textual factors, management opportunities, and above all it relies on incorporating all 
potential causes (structural, intermediate and triggers) to the proposals and policies 
of reform and peaceful change. 
In sum, the goal for conflict prevention is to generate and strengthen the inter-
nalization of the three preventors, mainly oriented to the intermediate and trigger 
causes, but also the preventors for the structural causes.
 5.2. thE mEso PErsPECtIvE: Pros AND CoNs oF DECENtrAlIzED  
 GovErNANCE IN CoNFlICt PrEvENtIoN 
So far we have addressed the literature situated in three macro perspectives only 
indirectly focalized on decentralized governance and conflict prevention. We have 
evaluated the role of development and the transition to democracy or institution-
al design in bringing about peaceful governance in various countries of the South. 
Essentially, the prevailing approach thus far has been one focused in deep structural 
and underlying causes and their corresponding preventors. In coherence, the policies 
and proposal addressed to structural and intermediate causes are not focused on the 
direct relation between decentralized governance and conflict prevention.
Let us now turn to what has been said in articles and in papers on the theoreti-
cal and/or actual direct relationship between decentralized governance and conflict 
prevention in different cases, in varying contexts. First we will address some general 
issues like the role of normal politics as violence preventor and conflict management 
tool. After, we will then focus on the specific pros and cons of the relationship bet-
ween decentralized governance and prevention.
We have classified and ordered the literature, the theses of different books and 
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papers, in function of our view about the root causes of violent conflict. In line with 
parts 1 and 2 of this thesis, we have decided to sort the views of the literature in rela-
tion to their relevance to our thesis topic.  We will therefore, concentrate our analysis 
here on the root causes and structural or long –term preventors of the intermediate 
causes, or accelerators, and finally of the triggers.
Before, however, we would like to address the politics and respective policies that, 
by definition, attempt to prevent violent behaviour in conflicts, and those that seek 
to manage a large number of preferences, interests and needs, which exist in every 
society. The politics must always, in contexts where resources are limited and there 
exists tension over how they should be distributed, seek mechanisms to manage re-
quests and interests, to allocate preferences, control tensions and conflicts, and of 
course make decisions. In short, conflict prevention and conflict management are 
always present in normal, everyday politics.
More specifically, and entering the subject at hand, Brancati, for example, notes 
that “decentralization is a useful mechanism in reducing both ethnic conflict and se-
cessionism” (Brancati, 2006), a relatively common thesis. But what makes for a more 
interesting endeavour, is identifying the positive effects of decentralized governance 
on the prevention of conflicts and evaluating how these impacts are realized in the 
real world. We are going to directly address this task by observing the significant and 
lasting influence that decentralization maintains in conflict prevention. To approach 
this undertaking we are going to put forward the following hypothesis: the positive 
or negative impact of decentralized governance is a function of its capacity to directly 
alter the causes of conflict, whether structural, accelerators or triggers- through the 
generation of incentives, which can act as war preventors within the framework of 
democratic institutions.   
It should be noted, however, that the task of assessing and measuring is a difficult 
one. There are serious complications in quantitatively and qualitatively evaluating 
the impacts of decentralization on conflict prevention, particularly in the medium-
and long-term, as shown in the next box.
 box 12: ChAllENGEs to mEAsurE thE ImPACt oF  
 DECENtrAlIzAtIoN 
A small disclaimer must be made in relation to the difficulties one encounters in 
measuring the impacts of decentralization on conflict prevention before one pro-
ceeds. Despite the large number of studies on this phenomenon, many experts 
do not dare to specifically assess the impact of decentralized governance on the 
prevention of violent conflict (Rodden, 2004).
The difficulty is twofold: the first complication lies in isolating and observing the 
impact of decentralization policies in one particular area (because it has effects in 
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many fields at once;  and secondly, exists the difficulty of obtaining comparable 
data between different territories However, if despite these obstacles, conclu-
sions can be drawn concerning the relationship between the two phenomena, 
although it may be general, it does allow for the benefit of identifying the risks 
and advantages of decentralization processes.
Like many experts in the field, the academic literature on decentralized governance 
argues that when it is applied in the proper context, it can be an important tool for 
conflict prevention, because it may help defuse some of the causes that contribute to 
violent behaviors. 
Let’s now turn to an analysis of plausible and credible impacts, both positive and 
negative, of decentralized governance on the structural causes, intermediate or acce-
lerators and, finally, triggers of violent conflict. 
 thE ImPACt oN struCturAl CAusEs 
The literature on this matter agrees that the potential impact of decentralized govern-
ance on the structural causes of conflict is limited, at least in the short-and medium-
term. This can be attributed to the fact that it is very difficult to influence the causes 
which we have labeled “necessary and structural”. The impact of decentralized gov-
ernance depends on its combined action with other policies, such as development 
and development cooperation, distribution and redistribution policies, the political 
system and political parties system, or the relationship between government and civil 
society. In short, the coherence between policies and the whole synergy and harmony 
is more important that the only impact of one of them, as decentralization.
We are still able to highlight certain examples, however, where decentralization 
does have a positive impact on structural causes.  The first area in which decentralized 
rule can reduce the structural causes of conflict is in the economy and in particular, in 
the allocation and distribution of resources.  As has been previously noted, there are 
now fewer major armed conflicts, new conflicts are mostly intra-state.  In most cases 
these conflict have a political dimension, but very often they also involve an economic 
dynamic. Moreover, a large part of these conflicts are located in the Global South 
or in states going through political or economic transition, whereby inequality and 
exclusion are common throughout. Poverty and social exclusion are indeed different 
phenomena: Sub-Saharan Africa is the most impoverished area on the planet, but 
Latin America is the region with highest levels of social inequality in the world. Both 
social wrongs, however, generate feelings of grievance and obvious relative depriva-
tion, and often become the source of potential conflict, and potentially a causal fac-
tor for the transition to decentralized rule. Naturally, one cannot ignore the political 
motivations that commonly act as catalysts for movements towards decentralization, 
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but it seems that economic inequalities and asymmetries, have gained weight in the 
discourse on decentralization. As shown by Rodriguez-Pose, “the political rationale 
for devolution across the globe has also evolved, and shifting from emphasis on cultu-
ral, ethnic, linguistic, or religious factors (...) to one of achieving economic and social 
change” (Rodriguez - Pose, 2003).
Once again, however, there is also reasonable doubt regarding the positive impact 
of decentralization on national economies and distribution of wealth, and, consis-
tently, differences between the experts.  Siegle and O’Mahony indicate that “in fact, 
this analysis shows that relatively higher levels of sub national expenditure and em-
ployment as well as authentic politics decentralization are linked to a lower probabi-
lity of ethnic conflict” (Siegle and O’Mahony, 2006).  While others affirm that “des-
pite the often proclaimed benefits of decentralization for enhanced service delivery, 
efficiency, convergence and growth, the evidence is at best inconclusive” (Brosio and 
Ahmad, 2008). 
In other words, the “economic dividend,” by using an analogy associated with the 
“peace dividend” which was fashionable in the early years of the Cold War, evalua-
tes decentralized governance founded on the idea of proximity.  Having the govern-
ment nearer to its citizens insinuated better governance. But, ‘proximity politics’ is 
not enough. Consequently, fulfilling the basic needs of the population is ultimately 
crucial to reducing, or at least disabling potential causes for conflict or an escalation 
towards violence. The rationale here is clear and convincing: we must assume that 
some public services will be better provided and will be more effective if they are 
managed by sub-state governments, facilitating a better allocation of resources and 
satisfaction of preferences and needs.  If these public services do in fact maintain a 
fundamental role in improving the living conditions of citizens, as with education 
and health, it can be reasonably expected that in the medium and longer term these 
actions will help reduce the structural causes that lead to the outbreak of conflicts. An 
example of the potential economic benefits of decentralization is found, in the case 
already mentioned through the outward decentralization sponsored by the interna-
tional organizations, particularly through international financial institutions (IFIs).
But, there are also potential negative effects that decentralized governance can 
impose on the structural causes of conflict. Some experts in the field warn that decen-
tralization can “freeze” conflicts, thus preventing the normal development of social 
relationships.  Consequently, if processes of decentralization or decentralized gover-
nance lead to the crystallization of ethnic divisions, this may help maintain or perpe-
tuate the structural causes of conflict (Monteux, 2008), leading to further asymmetry, 
which can ultimately act as a cause to trigger conflict. To take a well known example: 
the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is of particular concern to the extent 
that the situations of the independent regions of the Bosniak/Croat Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska maintain, if not 
aggravate-ethnic dividing lines.  
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 thE ImPACt oN INtErmEDIAtE CAusEs or ACCElErAtors 
In relation to the intermediate causes of conflict, there is an important area where 
decentralized governance may have a positive effect and that is on the distribution 
of power. The distribution of power, even if it is not entirely balanced, acts as a war-
preventor through reducing the possibility of accelerators or intermediate causes 
for conflict. When the distribution of power is more equitable and power-sharing 
arrangement are genuine and profound, whereby the parties and/ or groups (ethnic, 
political, social, etc.) actually enjoy influence over governmental decisions, the less 
likely the emergence of a violent conflict is going to be. In this regard, one of the key 
capabilities of decentralization, as an element of conflict prevention, is its capacity 
to include new political groups through the distribution of power (Schou and Haug, 
2005).  We have also summarized above the work of Sriram to address this point. 
Decentralization processes may allow for the participation of excluded minority 
groups at the national level. With decentralization various social groups have the op-
portunity to form political parties who, despite being in the minority, have a political 
space that allows them to defend their interests and make their preferences public. 
Recall that partaking in electoral processes is one of the key incentives offered in 
peace processes and negotiations. In this manner decentralization can assuage the 
yearning of secessionist groups to separate, because they are now represented and 
recognized politically, subsequently, minimizing the risk of violent dispute. This in-
clusion can, therefore, defuse what could become potential or permissive causes for 
violent conflict in the future. The participation of all actors in politics helps transform 
conflicts by facilitating open discussions channeled through existing institutions. A 
paradigmatic example in this regard is the Catalan case and Spanish case, one of the 
case-study of the Forum. 
In the same vein, running parallel to the inclusion of new groups, a second in-
centive is present, which is the rise of democratic legitimacy via the recognition of 
minorities and the deepening of the distribution of power. Incorporating new groups 
and ensuring the participation of minorities through new spaces for political repre-
sentation reinforces democracy. Such potential benefits of decentralized governance 
can be developed to reduce the intermediate causes of violent conflict, the accele-
rators. Many experts point out that decentralization can serve as a mechanism that 
pulls sub-national groups to enter into negotiation processes with the central state 
and other levels of government. If there is a more equitable distribution of power, 
which incorporates a larger number of actors in decision-making processes the le-
gitimacy of public institutions is enhanced (Sisk, 2001). There are several examples 
of this strengthening of the state through decentralization on the African continent. 
Power-sharing and representation arrangements, institutionalized through decen-
tralization, have served to attract minorities and regions threatening to secede, such 
as in the case of Nigeria.  Decentralized rule also works to strengthen the unitary 
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state after open conflict, as in South Africa after the apartheid. In fact, decentralized 
governance, in these cases, appears to have solved a key element of what the United 
States literature about conflict resolution has called “intractable conflicts”, or pro-
tracted social conflicts (Edward Azar).
Also in relation to power-sharing, and as a corollary of the above, another po-
tential positive impact on the intermediate causes of conflict is the promotion of sta-
bility.  The distribution of power among a larger number of levels and actors, as is 
common in the multilevel governments common in western democracies, appears 
to reduce problems and disruption in decision making and to increase the space for 
potential vetoes.  This increased capacity for refutation and dissidence management 
offered by a decentralized system limits the ability for abrupt changes and strengthen 
the negotiation processes through governance incentives. The number of stable de-
centralized countries is high, and a perfect case in point is the United States, which 
is a huge, stable country with 300 million inhabitants (a large number of which are 
minorities), who have had a constitution detailing decentralization dating back to no 
less than 1787.
There remains a third area where decentralization potentially, positively impacts 
the intermediate causes for war and violence through power-sharing: to increase 
transparency and accountability. A greater number of governing levels and the pre-
sence of more actors (governmental and non-governmental, as the civil society) pro-
mote government control, with the consequence of increasing transparency.  From 
the point of view of institutional choice, one can argue that the vertical division of 
powers (decentralized governance) can have effects similar to those of horizontal di-
vision, whereby the different powers and the performance of their functions is mo-
nitored. Here we can talk about checks and balances as an essential component of 
genuine democracy
There remains one final area that we will discuss here; which although minor 
must be taken into account: the positive impact that decentralized governance has 
on administrative efficiency. Administrative efficiency can also be regarded as a war 
preventor to the extent that it functions eroding the underlying causes for violence 
because the system works, the government can provide a better and a more cost-
efficient service, and, also, closer to the citizen. It is not easy to deduce what is the 
optimum scale for the provision of each service, but it is intuitively easy to unders-
tand that planning for national defence is not the same as that for urban transport 
planning.  It is recommended that each level of government should have jurisdiction 
over the areas where its control and production can be more efficient (the so-called 
principle of subsidiarity).
However, not all of decentralization’s impacts on intermediate causal factors are 
positive, so far seeming paradisiacal. Despite the potential positive outcomes listed 
above, decentralized governance can also lead to some potentially negative effects 
on the nature of the conflict, its evolution and on relationships and interests in each 
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phase.  Many authors warn us that the positive effects of decentralized governance 
(in conflict prevention or in other areas) are not guaranteed. The results may even be 
perverse. One can therefore, not ignore the fact that the implementation of decentra-
lizing measures, such as those already discussed, may have unwanted effects, feeding 
the intermediate causes of conflict.
Some social movements, armed or not, can use decentralization as a step to seces-
sion or as a formula to achieve independence. Their inclusion in governance through 
decentralization may strengthen the legitimacy of the existing divisions and causing 
further instability. This slippery slope, of entering into agreements on decentralized 
governance with groups seeking independence, is possibly the main fears of central 
governments unwilling or reluctant to implement decentralization processes. The es-
tablishment of decentralized institutions and processes may be associated with an in-
creased permissiveness towards the demands of minorities, creating an environment 
prone to independence.  
The clearest examples of this occurring are found in the Soviet bloc after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall; the case of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia is illustrative of the 
way this dismantling process may unfold. Even in cases where decentralization is 
more consolidated, as it is in Spain, there are increasing critical voices regarding the 
current amount of decentralization and the level of independence, and the emergence 
of new parties, who are conversely, strongly opposed to decentralization illustrate the 
existence of tensions associated with the relative power of subnational governments.
Among the possible negative causes of decentralized governance at the inter-
mediate level, the proliferation of regional parties must also be evaluated (Brancati, 
2006).  Decentralization politics tends to reinforce minority identities, creating or 
strengthen ethnic-politic cleavages, and may result in one of the necessary or struc-
tural causes of violent-prone conflict. Therefore, while the direct effect of decentra-
lization may be to reduce conflict-potential and limit secessionist wills, it may also 
indirectly have a negative effect by allowing the emergence of regional parties who 
are prepared to pursue minority goals, leading conversely, to an increase in seces-
sionist demands. Also, if within the framework of regional parliaments, secessionist 
minority groups achieve significant levels of power, one of the potential pitfalls of 
decentralization is that these groups, having the capacity to legislate, may do so in 
manner which goes against the interests of a part of citizenship. The current situation 
in Belgium (which was mentioned by Brancati as a successful), with strong tensions 
between Flemish and francophone parties, could illustrate this aspect.
A final negative consequence is found in the administrative dimension, which can 
be described as a lack of coordination between levels of government. The shared res-
ponsibility over public goods can end up with the emergence of free riders. This may 
occurs if a certain level of government tries to benefit from the lack of coordination 
and of central control to maximize its profits without contributing to overall creation 
of wealth. A good example of this lack of coordination could be Bosni-Herzegovina; 
37
following the results of the decentralization round table at the Balkans Regional Se-
minar organized by the Mediterranean Commission of United Cities and Local Go-
vernments, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a clear case of lack of coordination mechanisms 
between government levels.
 thE ImPACt oN ImmEDIAtE CAusEs or trIGGErs 
We come now to the immediate causes of conflict, the “drop that fills the cup” and 
provokes the occurrence of violence. The decentralized governance can help pre-
vent or reduce violent conflict, in that it potentially has the capacity to disable the 
immediate causes or triggers of war or violence. What gains importance here is the 
improvement in the allocation of preferences in a more egalitarian fashion, essen-
tially matching preferences with public policies, which may in turn have a preventing 
impact on violent behaviour?  In this sense decentralization can act as an impediment 
of the triggers of an outbreak of violence. The argument posited here is that local and 
regional governments have more information on the necessities and preferences of 
citizens, so they can properly prioritize policies and appropriately implement them. 
If the various levels of government have more information on citizenship and are able 
to detect more quickly the needs of the population, then it is concluded that there is 
less probability of a conflict breaking out in response to minorities feeling that their 
demands are not being taken into account. This proper allocation and channelling of 
society’s demands eases the triggers of conflict.
Along the same lines, we find the stability conferred by the existence of an articu-
lated institutional complex of procedures and norms as a potential war preventor, as 
a diffuser of conflict triggers. By acting as a network, a stable institutional complex 
can inhibit conductors of violence. The creation of a network of links based on go-
vernance incentives affects the spread of conflict, since it distributes responsibilities 
to the players involved in the negotiation process and limits the potential gains in 
case of conflict. In a context in which each level has a number of responsibilities, and 
therefore areas of expertise, the groups will need to learn to negotiate. The creation 
of structures to make decisions and their implement through the formation of a net-
work provides a series of links (both administrative and political), which promote 
collaboration. This structural network functions as a conflict preventor, disabling 
possible triggers and hindering the emergence of violent conflict. The case of India 
illustrates how the existence of a political, economic and social complex makes the 
emergence of conflict difficult (Sinha, 2005).
The last group of potential positive effects of decentralized governance with res-
pect to diffusing conflict triggers is found in the flexibility and innovation of non-
central governmental institutions, particularly in the short term. The governing 
proximity between new levels of government and citizens allows for the tailoring and 
innovation of action (especially action which is taken in response to the potential out-
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break of a conflict), which the central state is not capable of doing.  Specifically, sub-
national governments are more directly responsible for the welfare of their identified 
population; this may lead them to try to improve their situation through the imple-
mentation of more innovative policies (Rodriguez-Pose, 2005). Furthermore, com-
petition among municipalities and regions promotes growth and innovation, because 
the small scale makes it easier to find successful solutions to problems that could lead 
to the outbreak of a violent conflict.  It is mainly in the political management of pu-
blic spending on services and in the collection of taxes where innovation can be seen 
more often. It should be noted that the theme of innovation is important not only in 
economic terms, since subnational governments may also function as laboratories in 
the political arena; it is easier to experiment with and implement innovative policies 
at a smaller-scale, then at higher levels. An illustrative example is the case of the 
Brazilian city of Porto Alegre with the implementation of the innovative participatory 
budgeting formulas, which was done for many years (but is no longer the case).
Unfortunately, decentralized governance can also act as trigger for a new con-
flict, directly or indirectly. From the standpoint of the economy and the distribution 
of wealth, decentralization processes may have unwanted effects. Although corrup-
tion is a real problem at all levels of government, in many countries, the processes of 
implementation of decentralized governance can result in the emergence of local or 
regional tyrannies, which seek to monopolize the political game.   This usually takes 
place for economic reasons, which consequently, has an adverse affect on the proper 
functioning of the various levels of government, and may end up triggering conflicts. 
In the same line of argument, we find another risk cited by experts in the field 
and that is the furthering of inequality. This is especially acute in cases where there is 
great disparity in the distribution of resources. In cases like this you run into the risk 
of creating conditions which are conducive to accelerating the intermediate causes of 
conflict and, finally, the occurrence of violence. An example is the will of the Bolivian 
department of Santa Cruz for more powers, especially in the managing of their own 
natural resources, and further events.
The following box summarizes the ideas just presented on the potential positive 
and negative impacts of the decentralized governance on the three types of causal 
factors of violent conflict.
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 box 13. DECENtrAlIzED GovErNANCE AND CoNFlICt  
 PrEvENtIoN: ImPACts oN CAusEs 
Structural
Causes
- Satisfying basic 
needs
Positive Impact Negative Impact
- Crystallization of 
ethnic divides
- Inclusion of new 
political groups
- Increase in legitima-
cy in democracy
- Increase of stability
- Increased 
transparency
- Efficient administra-
tive capacities
- Stepping stone to 
secession
- Proliferation of 
regional parties
- Lack or coordination 
between the levels
- Ability to match  
or fulfill and imple-
ment preferences
- Existence of an 
articulated institu-
tional complex
- Flexibility and 
innovation
- Local or regional 
tyrannies that 
monopolize the 
political game
- Furthering of  
inequalities
Accelerators
or
Intermediate
causes
Triggers or 
intermediate
causes
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 6 .  CoNClusIoNs AND FurthEr  
 rEsEArCh 
The analysis proposed by this paper merges two conceptual and practical proposals 
that, separately, have played an important role in the debates on the peacebuilding 
and conflict transformation field during the last 15 years, in the academic world as 
well as in the praxis of international organizations, non-central governments (cities, 
regions) and NGOs. Those concepts are conflict prevention and decentralization and 
decentralized governance. 
Even though it is widely accepted that decentralized governance contributes to the 
prevention of violent conflict during different phases (from the very outset until the 
outbreak of the conflict, and even after a peace agreement), the veracity and univer-
sality of the link between decentralized governance and conflict prevention has not 
been studied in depth. This is exactly what this paper attempts to tackle.
The paper starts from two assumptions. First, the commitment with the initial 
axiom of peace research and conflict transformation: the causes of war/violence can 
be known and, consequently, it is possible to propose actions to avoid them (pre-
ventors), even in contexts of emergent conflicts. Secondly, and a commitment of the 
ICIP, it is deemed necessary to create and Observatory on Decentralized Governance 
and Conflict Prevention.  Thus an additional task is to establish operational defini-
tions and complete a critical study of the existent literature.
After stating the initials assumptions and objectives of the paper, the second sec-
tion has been devoted to the current context; the confluence of new types of armed 
conflicts (intra-state, with a strong political dimension, including those conflicts whe-
re there is social unrest and demands of power and resources distribution), the pro-
cess of urbanization and the spreading of decentralization processes.
The new demands for security based on people (human security), and new threats 
and types of violence (drug trafficking, juvenile violence, etc.) generate challenges for 
societies and states. Principles of sovereignty and non-interference continue to be ba-
sic in international relations, but they have been perforated and challenged from se-
veral angles such as from the emergence of new actors, the confluence of peace agen-
das, security and development, the appearance of new ethical and political demands 
(like the responsibility to protect during humanitarian crises that, even though they 
are internal, might end up provoking major armed conflicts).
The third section of the paper has been devoted to the creation of an analytical 
framework, paying particular attention to the causes of war and the role of violence 
preventors. In this section, conflict prevention is defined as every mean that allows 
for the reduction of violence and limits the outbreak of armed conflict; it aims at ge-
nerating a mechanism that transforms conflict and eliminates or reduces the causes 
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that sustain it. Theses causes can be structural, intermediate as well as trigger causes. 
Provided that all the causes should be faced, conflict prevention is focused basica-
lly on the short- and medium-term causes (triggers and intermediate). On the other 
hand, peacebuilding, development and cooperation are focus on in the long-term as 
structural causes.
It has been shown that there are practices and instruments, the so-called preven-
tors, which allow for the extension of peaceful change vis-à-vis violent change. Three 
elements are essential to manage (inevitable) social conflicts and to promote peaceful 
change: first, democratization and  institutional design, which focus on the institu-
tional policies and procedures to transform conflicts, particularly in decentralized 
governance; secondly, structural changes that promote development and human se-
curity, given the fact that they reduce imbalances and social exclusion, improves the 
welfare of human beings, and help to establish less conflict-prone societies; and thir-
dly, good governance, inclusion incentives, and power-sharing incentives (political, 
and also in security structures and resources sharing).
Sections four and five have been devoted to defining conflict prevention and de-
centralized governance, as well as analyzing the impacts of the latter on the former. In 
this process the complexity of assessing these impacts is discussed in the light of the 
heterogeneity of experiences.  The difficulty in identifying causality or the absence of 
long-term comparable data is also addressed. Thus, the paper focuses on evaluating 
the effects of decentralization in concrete cases in the short- and medium-term. This 
is done from both a macro and a meso perspectives (engaging conflict prevention 
and decentralized governance, as well as taking decentralization as a direct factor of 
violence reduction).
This approach has allowed us to extract several conclusions:
 A.  From A GENErAl AND mACro PErsPECtIvE 
The strategies of institutional design, for example in the field of decentralization, 
democratization and power-sharing, are diverse; there is never a single option. 
Institutional choices can be made in a  great variety of ways and, thus, there is no 
universal recipe.
1. The success or failure of this approach will depend, not only of the strategies used, 
but also contextual factors, history and, in particular, cultural factors. In general, 
strategies that have taken into account the cultural and social features of the socie-
ties tend to work better, leading us to state that context-sensitive approaches have 
a higher probability of success.
2. Power-sharing incentives are sometimes too traditional; very often the success 
of these initiatives depends on the ability to offer more nuanced governance 
incentives.
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3. In the case of strategies dealing with development processes, the role of ‘global 
drivers’ should be taken into account, particularly given the need to reform global 
institutions.
4. When fostering democratization, decentralization,  governance incentives, and 
human development, it should be acknowledged that reaching these strategic 
goals could imply the appearance of collateral problems and even contradictions; 
very often negative effects will arise in the medium- and long-term.
5. More generally, it is important to acknowledge the rights of minority groups, con-
sequently, accepting the right of people to decide the shape of their own govern-
ments within the limits established by international legality. Again, we run into 
the debate about the limits of sovereignty, a very relevant issue in the post-Cold 
War world.
 
 b. From A mEso AND ImPACt-AssEssmENt PErsPECtIvE 
6. The impacts of decentralized governance can be detected mainly on the interme-
diate and immediate causes (triggers). Regarding structural causes, which are key 
on the long run, a broader analysis must take place given the need to study the 
coherence of diverse policies, including peacebuilding and development and deve-
lopment cooperation
7. In terms of intermediate causes, decentralized governance can act as a war pre-
ventor through the inclusion of new political groups, strengthening democratic 
legitimacy, and fostering stability and administrative efficiency.
8. Regarding immediate causes, decentralized governance limits the possibility of 
violent outbreak through the creation of a complex institutional network that 
reduces the benefits of those thinking on using violence as a means of reaching 
their goals; at the same time, power-sharing improves the process of matching 
preferences and provides the state with a higher degree of flexibility innovation 
potential.
9. However, decentralized governance is not a panacea; its implementation could 
foster undesired effects or even produce results completely opposed to those it is 
trying to obtain. 
10.In some cases, it is possible that decentralization measures result in serious pro-
blems of lack of coordination, the appearance of regional parties willing to legis-
late against important parts of the citizenry, the unleash of local tyrannies , the 
growth of economic disparities or the crystallization of ethnic divisions.
In sum, as a general conclusion, a three-fold thesis can be contended:
a. Decentralized governance might have very positive effects in terms of conflict 
prevention, given its ability to foster the creation of war/violence preventors 
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and by reducing (or eliminating) the three types of causes that generate violent 
behaviors.
b. Provided that decentralized governance focuses on intermediate and immedia-
te causes, coordination and coherence of long-term policies (both internally and 
internationally) should not be forgotten. Specifically, the coherence between pea-
cebuilding, conflict prevention, development and human security policies remains 
a key issue to achieve peaceful societies in the long-term.
c. The use of decentralized governance as a war preventor mechanism is not exempt 
of risks and its success cannot be guarantee because of the existence of unpredic-
table contextual factors. In other words, the implementation of decentralization 
processes could entail perverse effects that deepen the causes of conflict instead of 
contributing to its transformation and resolution.
It remains clear that there is a long road ahead. Once the link between decentralized 
governance and conflict prevention has been established, further research should 
continue, analyzing the capacity of decentralized governance as a war preventor. 
Until now, we know very few things. 
As show in box 14, the graph developed by Sasaoka illustrates the need to com-
bine the goals of decentralization that could prevent a conflict situation (social deve-
lopment, establishment of governance, supression of post-conflict antagonism, etc.) 
with the motivations for decentralization (governance design, public sector reform, 
elite capture, etc.) provided they are different and often contradictory.
 box 14: ANAlytICAl FrAmEwork For DECENtrAlIzAtIoN AND  
 CoNFlICt PrEvENtIoN 
Sourge: Created by Yuichi Sasaoka. Note: Arrows do not connect all motivations and objectives
Conflict-
Related
Objectives
Political Dymanics between Majority and Minority
B 
Establishment
of Governance
C 
Suppression of
Post-conflict
Antagonism
A
Social
Development
Motivations for
decentralization
A
Governance
Design
B
Public Sector
Reform
C
Elite
Capture
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To know in each case what type of causal linkage, influences and correlation exist 
between conflict-related objectives and motivations for decentralization seems like a 
promising and suggestive task. However, this remains in the to-do list. 
Future investigations should develop the analysis presented in this paper through the 
following initiatives:
• The operationalization of an analytical framework that allows a case-by-case study 
of Sasaokas’s model.
• The identification of the scenarios and conditions which are conducive to the use 
of decentralized governance as a war preventor.
• The study of the necessary attributes for the correct implementation of decentra-
lized governance in a fashion that impedes the emergence of negative, undesired 
effects.
• The analysis of control and supervision mechanisms amongst actors, as well as the 
relation between activities and goals for each potential stakeholder in the decen-
tralization processes.
• In-depth case studies
All of the aforementioned lines of investigation will be tackled, should the ICIP devel-
op an Observatory on Decentralized Governance and Conflict Prevention in 2010. 
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